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The economic bene￿ts of debt relief for recipient countries have been the subject of arduous
debate, at least partly motivated by the di￿culty of identifying the causal e￿ect of debt relief on
economic performance ￿given that performance itself may drive the decision to grant relief. This
paper conducts an event study to assess the economic consequences of multilateral debt relief
for recipient countries that is robust to these reverse causality issues. It estimates the response
of the stock prices of South African multinationals with subsidiaries in those countries to the
announcement of debt relief initiatives, and shows that stock prices exhibit a signi￿cant increase
above those of other ￿rms, especially around the launching of the recent Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative. The improvement in ￿nancial markets’ assessment of the value of these multinationals
is consistent with lower expected levels of future taxation in the recipient countries. Overall,
the results are consistent with the ￿debt overhang￿ argument for debt relief.
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On July 8th 2005, the Heads of State and Government of the G8 meeting in Gleneagles, UK,
announced the launching of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), where they agreed to
cancel the historical debt of the world poorest countries with the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. Since multilateral institutions had become
these countries’ main creditors, the initiative, with an estimated debt write-o￿ of $50 bn, or about
70 percent of these countries’ total stock of debt was expected to provide substantial debt relief
(International Development Agency and International Monetary Fund (2006)). However, what
the broader public probably does not know is that, although drawing broader media coverage
and celebrity attention than its predecessors, the MDRI is just the latest incarnation of a series
of e￿orts to relieve poor countries’ ￿nancial obligations with multilateral institutions through the
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, set in motion in 1996 and modi￿ed (￿enhanced￿)
in 1999.
There are clear humanitarian motives for debt relief that are behind numerous calls from religious
leaders, celebrities, and intellectuals arguing that it is morally wrong to collect debt from countries
that are at the brink of starvation. However, the case for debt relief is also typically argued on
the grounds that current debt burdens maintain poor countries in a situation of debt overhang,
where socially and privately pro￿table investment opportunities are foregone because of the implicit
tax on their returns imposed by previous debt obligations (Krugman (1988); Sachs and Calvo
(1989)). Firms anticipating the high future taxes required to service a massive debt burden may
￿nd unpro￿table certain investment projects that they would otherwise ￿nance, and governments
may be reluctant to incur costly reforms if a large part of their returns would go to foreign creditors.
Since according to the debt overhang argument, debt relief should be associated with increased
private and social investment and better macroeconomic performance, many researchers have looked
for the impact of debt relief on growth and investment. However, ￿nding causal evidence of this
impact using aggregate data is di￿cult because countries that receive debt relief are not random;
countries with extremely high levels of debt and bad economic performance are more likely to receive
it. Therefore, one could ￿nd a negative correlation between debt relief and growth in aggregate
data, even if it actually improves the prospects of countries that receive it. Of course, it may also
be the case that countries with good economic prospects get debt relief, in whose case ￿nding a
positive correlation between debt relief and economic performance does not provide evidence that
the former causes the latter. Moreover, even if there is a causal link, debt relief will likely a￿ect
economic performance with a delay that di￿cults the identi￿cation of the impact using time series
variation. For these reasons, evidence based on aggregate data has to either just report correlations
or depend on strong identi￿cation assumptions.
This paper provides new evidence of the impact of multilateral debt relief initiatives using an
event-study to determine the e￿ect of these initiatives on ￿rms with operations in the countries they
bene￿ted. This approach has several advantages over studies based on aggregated data, because
it is much less likely to be a￿ected by reverse causality, and also takes advantage of the forward
1looking nature of stock prices to deal with the timing problems. The approach relies on the standard
assumption that stock prices quickly re￿ect the market’s view of the impact of these initiatives on
the value of ￿rms that operate in these countries, so, if these ￿rms’ values improve as a consequence
of debt forgiveness, there should be an abnormal increase in their stock prices around major debt
relief announcements.
Debt relief can impact the value of ￿rms operating in bene￿ted countries through two channels.
The ￿rst is through an improvement in the country’s economic prospects. Debt relief may induce
local governments to allocate more resources to public goods or human capital formation, or may
increase private investment, resulting in higher economic growth. To the extent that the value of
￿rms with operations in those countries is positively correlated with the state of aggregate demand,
future economic expansion would increase their value. The second channel is the reduced need
for future taxation. Absent severe contractions in public expenditure, repaying large levels of
public debt likely requires a high level of taxation. In poor countries, where income taxes are
hard to impose, these taxes tend to fall on companies.1 Therefore, as long as markets assign a
positive probability to the repayment of the debt, the relief should reduce expected taxation and
increase ￿rm value. If any of these channels is in operation, an event study on the behavior of the
share prices of publicly traded companies operating in HIPC countries around dates of debt relief
announcements provides an indirect test of the hypothesis that debt relief has a positive e￿ect on
economic performance .
Since HIPC countries typically lack well functioning and liquid stock markets, this paper follows
Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) and studies the response of the stock prices of multinational ￿rms
with subsidiaries and operations on HIPC countries, but that are traded in foreign, more developed
￿nancial markets. In particular, it focuses on South African multinational companies traded in the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), which is a one of the largest and most active emerging stock
markets, and where it is possible to obtain meaningful price data at a daily frequency. Focusing on
South African multinationals has the additional advantage that these companies are smaller than
global multinationals operating in African HIPC countries. Therefore, their operations in these
countries are relatively more important and their share prices more likely to respond to events
a￿ecting their subsidiaries.2
To implement this approach, I build a detailed chronology of the multilateral debt relief initia-
tives that allows me to identify the dates of di￿erent announcements related to the three major
initiatives implemented since 1996 (HIPC, Enhanced HIPC, and MDRI), including the dates when
individual countries reached any of the milestones considered in the HIPC framework (decision
points and completion points). I also gather stock price data for a sample of 35 South African
multinational companies with 187 subsidiaries and operations in African HIPC countries during the
1According to World Bank (2008) Paying Taxes Report, Sub-Saharan Africa is the continent with the highest
overall business taxes, including the highest average pro￿t taxes.
2Large global multinationals, such as Unilever, have operations in several African HIPC countries. However, it
is unlikely that Unilever’s stock price in the London Stock Exchange would vary importantly as a result of events
a￿ecting a marginal operation in Kenya. In contrast, operations in HIPC countries, while small, are not marginal for
South African multinationals.
2period 1995-2006￿when the various stages of the initiatives took place. I use these data to estimate
a two-factor return model and measure the abnormal returns of these companies around the dates
of the announcements, and to formally test the hypothesis that these abnormal returns are equal
to zero applying various parametric and non-parametric procedures.
The results show that stock prices of South African multinationals with operations in HIPC
eligible African countries exhibit an abnormal and statistically signi￿cant increase around the an-
nouncement dates of major debt relief initiatives. The magnitude of the increase is also economically
signi￿cant, with the announcements resulting in a cumulative abnormal return of about one per-
centage point for the typical parent company. Considering that the parent companies are usually at
least an order of magnitude larger than their a￿ected subsidiaries, these results suggest a two-digit
cumulative impact on the value of local operations.
Evidence comparing the various stages of multilateral debt relief programs indicates that the lat-
est phases (enhanced HIPC and MDRI) had a larger impact on HIPC connected multinational com-
panies than the original HIPC initiative. Also, country-speci￿c announcements about the achieve-
ment of the various milestones of the broad HIPC program (decision and completion points) have
little impact on ￿rms’ returns, although there is some evidence that reports of a country reaching
completion point positively impact the stock prices of related multinationals. Furthermore, the
stock price response takes place mainly around the formal announcements of the launching of the
major initiatives in the G8 Summit Meetings, with little evidence of stock reactions around the
Annual Meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, where the ￿nal details of
the implementation are disclosed.
Consistently with the interpretation that the increase in stock prices is related to ￿nancial mar-
ket’s reassessment of the value of ￿rms operating in countries bene￿ted by debt relief programs, the
increase in stock returns is larger among South African multinational companies that are relatively
more exposed to the events, as measured by the total employment in subsidiaries located in eligible
countries as a fraction of the employment of the parent company. This comparison further strength-
ens the causal interpretation of the ￿ndings, since it implicitly controls for any potential common
e￿ect a￿ecting all companies with operations in HIPC countries , or multinational ￿rms in general.
The stock price response to major debt relief announcements of parent companies in di￿erent
industries suggests that the underlying increase in value is mainly related to the expectation of
lower future taxes rather than improved economic prospects. Companies in resource extraction
industries, which are more likely to be the target of taxation and are less dependent on local
economic conditions, exhibit a signi￿cantly larger stock price increase than companies in service
industries where the relevance of local economic conditions vis-a-vis taxes reverses. This ￿nding
also indicates that the stock price response is not a mechanical response to potential real exchange
rate appreciation associated with debt forgiveness (Rajan and Subramanian (2005a), Rajan and
Subramanian (2005b)).
Overall, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that ￿nancial markets view the announce-
ments of major debt relief initiatives as positive news for ￿rms operating on these countries, resulting
3most likely from a reduction in expected taxes, and support the debt overhang hypothesis of the
costs of excessive debt.
This paper relates to the empirical literature on sovereign debt overhang and on the impact of
debt relief. Several papers in this literature have used aggregate data to test the debt overhang
hypothesis by looking at the relation between debt levels and growth or investment (Claessens
(1990), Deshpande (1997) Cordella et al. (2005), Imbs and Ranciere (2005)) and have identi￿ed
di￿erent thresholds over which debt burden is negatively correlated with growth, and in some cases
further thresholds above which debt has no growth e￿ect (Cordella et al. (2005)). A slightly di￿erent
line of research has been followed by Depetris-Chauvin and Kraay (2005), who instead of looking at
the relation between debt levels and macroeconomic performance directly study the growth e￿ect
of debt relief, ￿nding little evidence that countries experiencing relatively larger reductions in their
stock of debt tend to grow faster. While providing interesting results, the main concern with all
these papers is that their reliance on aggregate data exposes them to the econometric problems
arising from reverse causality and from debt relief not being randomly assigned to countries, and
that they have to rely on various econometric techniques and strong identi￿cation assumptions to
move from correlation to causality.
Indirect, but stronger evidence on the impact of debt relief has recently been provided by
Arslanalp and Henry (2005), who also use an event study approach to show that stock markets
indexes of countries bene￿ted by the Brady Plan signi￿cantly increased relative to a control group
after the announcement of the plan. However, since HIPC countries typically lack stock markets
Arslanalp and Henry (2005) do not apply their methodology to estimate the impact of the HIPC
initiative, and rely instead on indirect arguments to conjecture that HIPC countries are unlikely to
bene￿t from the type of debt relief provided by the Brady Plan because investment in these countries
is not constrained by debt overhang but for bad institutions (Arslanalp and Henry (2006)). An
additional concern with this paper is that, by looking only at aggregate, country level indicators,
their estimates may be contaminated by the endogeneity of the decision to extend the Brady Plan to
a particular country, which may be correlated with that country’s economic prospects (Kovrijnykh
and Szentes (2007)).
This paper contributes to this literature by providing indirect evidence from ￿rm level perfor-
mance of the impact of multilateral debt relief on HIPC countries that is less likely to be contami-
nated by endogeneity concerns for several reasons. First, it focuses on the announcement of major
initiatives that bene￿ted a large set of countries and that are unlikely to be motivated by any spe-
ci￿c country’s economic prospects. Second, it exploits the forward looking information contained in
the variation in stock prices around speci￿c event dates and relies on local variation of stock prices
at a daily frequency to identify the e￿ect of debt relief. Therefore, the ￿ndings are not driven by
any existing information on a countrie’s economic prospects that was available a few days before
the announcements. Finally, the use of ￿rm level data also di￿erentiates among ￿rms with ex-ante
di￿erent exposure to the events to provide a further test that controls for common shocks.
From a methodological standpoint, this paper is closely related to a recent article by Guidolin
4and La Ferrara (2007) that also uses an event study to estimate the impact of civil con￿ict on
multinational ￿rms operating diamond mines in Angola. In contrast to Guidolin and La Ferrara
(2007), this paper concentrates on a completely di￿erent question and focuses on multinationals on
an indirect manner, using them to gauge the impact of debt relief on local ￿rms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of multilateral debt
relief to poor countries and presents a chronology of the initiatives that is used to identify the dates
of various announcements. Section 3 describes the methodological approach and data. Section 4
presents the all the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Multilateral Debt Relief to Poor Countries
2.1 A Brief History of Multilateral Debt Relief to Poor Countries
Historically, countries that became part of the group of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (henceforth
HIPC) had little access to commercial lending and relied instead on o￿cial ￿nancing in the form
of bilateral loans from industrial countries and multilateral loans from institutions such as the
IMF, the World Bank, and various regional development banks. O￿cial loans to these countries
gradually increased until the early 1980s, when many started having problems to service their debts,
at the same time as several middle income countries. However, while middle income countries
that defaulted on their commercial loans were shut from international capital markets, industrial
countries’ governments and multilateral institutions reacted to the debt problems of low income
countries by rescheduling payments and extending further bilateral and multilateral loans that
would allow these countries to avoid defaulting. For this reason, and in contrast to most middle
income countries, low income countries maintained a positive net resource transfer during the 1980s
(Birdsall and Williamson (2002)).
This additional lending to poor countries was not typically accompanied by growth, resulting
on further debt accumulation as a fraction of GDP. By the late 1980s, most low-income countries
exhibited symptoms of unsustainable debt levels, with debt-to-export and debt to GDP ratios close
to 400 and 150 percent, respectively. At that stage, it became evident that low-income countries
were unable to fully serve their o￿cial debt, and that some form of broad debt forgiveness was
required.
Systematic debt relief to poor countries initially took place on bilateral loans to Paris Club
creditors under what became known as the Toronto Terms, the Trinidad Terms, the London Terms,
and the Naples Terms, all which provided rescheduling under concessional (i.e. below market)
interest rates equivalent to a reduction in the net-present-value of the debt stock of about $30
billion.3 At the same time, new bilateral ￿ows started increasingly taking the form of grants.
As a result, an increasing fraction of the debt of low-income countries was owed to multilateral
institutions and it was apparent that helping these countries achieve debt sustainability required
3See Daseking and Powell (1999)
5some form of relief from multilateral debt, which had historically being treated as senior to all other
claims and repaid in full, even if by rolling-over old loans.4
Multilateral debt relief to poor countries started with the launching of the Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) in September 1996 at the 22nd meeting of the G8 countries in Lyon, France. The
goal of this initiative was to reduce the debt burden of eligible countries to levels considered manage-
able, conditional on satisfactory policy performance, and involved cooperation among multilateral
and bilateral creditors. Under the initiative, debtor countries with per capita income under $695
and ratios of net-present-value of debt to exports above 200 or 250 percent (depending on coun-
try characteristics) would qualify for the program.5 Qualifying countries with six years of stable
macroeconomic conditions under an IMF program would reach a decision point, in which creditors
arrange a debt relief package, and after no more than three additional years of successful policy
implementation they would reach a completion point, when they would actually start receiving debt
relief. Contrary to initial expectations, only six of the 40 countries that were eligible for HIPC relief
had reached a decision point in 1999, and only one￿ Uganda, had reached completion point.
The slow advances of debt relief under the original HIPC initiative, mainly the result of eligibility
conditions, led to criticism from international aid groups and African governments who were calling
for substantial modi￿cations to the initiative, and a consensus emerged among industrial countries
for faster implementation of debt relief. As a result, the leaders of the G-7 countries, meeting in
Cologne in June 1999, announced a comprehensive review on the HIPC initiative to provide faster,
deeper, and broader debt reduction in what became known as the Enhanced HIPC Initiative (E-
HIPC). The main changes consisted in broadening of the eligibility criteria by reducing the debt-to-
export ratio to 150 percent, and shortening of the time required to reach the decision point to three
years. Moreover, a country reaching decision point under the enhanced HIPC would immediately
receive some debt relief in the form of reduced debt service. Debt stock reductions would take place
once the country reached the completion point. The enhanced initiative also put emphasis on a
country’s commitment to poverty reduction in two ways: ￿rst, in addition to a good policy track
record, a country had to submit a sustainable poverty reduction strategy to become eligible (in the
form of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, PRSP, written with participation of civil society);
second, countries had to commit to use the resources freed by debt relief to achieve the goals set
in the PRSP. Because of the broader eligibility criteria and of public pressure, sixteen additional
countries were approved for decision point, and started receiving debt relief in the year 2000.
The HIPC initiative emphasized the reduction of debt burdens to sustainable levels to help
bene￿ted countries ￿ght poverty, but the view that multilateral debt cancellation was the only
possible solution to the problems of HIPC countries became increasingly popular shortly after the
announcement of the enhanced version of the initiative. As a result, a broad campaign was launched
to convince leaders of industrial countries, those with most voting rights on multilateral institutions,
4There is no consensus on whether multilaterals engage in defensive lending. While some authors argue that this
is the case (Bulow and Rogo￿, 2005), other have found no robust evidence of such behavior in the data (Kraay and
Geginat, 2007)
5The ratio was replaced by 280 percent of government revenue for very open economies
6to provide some form of debt forgiveness. This campaign culminated in the announcement of the
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) at the Gleneagles Summit Meeting of the Heads of State
and Government of G8 countries in July 2005. The goal of this initiative is to further reduce the
debts of HIPC countries and help them achieve the Millennium Development Goals set by world
leaders in September 2000, during the United Nations Millennium Summit. Although the initiative
operates similarly to the HIPC, its main di￿erence is that it contemplates that once a country
completes the HIPC process (i.e. reaches completion point), all debt it contracted with the IMF,
the World Bank, and the African Development Bank before 2003-2004 would be forgiven. 6
2.2 Multilateral Debt Relief Event Dates
This paper’s analysis separately considers two types of multilateral debt relief events: (i) those
common to all eligible countries, such as the announcements of the di￿erent stages of the HIPC
initiative and the MDRI (henceforth labeled major initiatives), and (ii) those that bene￿t an indi-
vidual HIPC country, such as the announcement that a nation has reached a decision or completion
point.
The brief historical discussion above evidences that major initiatives are typically a matter of
lengthy discussions, so a choice has to be made regarding the relevant announcement dates. For all
three major initiatives, the announcement process typically entails three stages. During the ￿rst
stage there are numerous requests for debt relief that place the discussion of an initiative in the
agenda of a G8 Summit Meeting. In the second stage, which takes place during or shortly before
the summit, the ￿nance ministers of G8 countries agree on the details of the forthcoming initiative.
Finally, the Heads of State and Government of G8 countries formally announce the initiative during
the summit meeting, with the exact details of ￿nancing, implementation, eligibility, etc., to be
worked out in the coming months, and disclosed during the Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The chronology of these stages for the
three major multilateral debt relief initiatives is summarized in Table 1. A detailed chronology of
the initiatives, including all the discussion meetings is available in the Appendix.
For each major debt relief initiative, the event dates are selected following a semi de-facto
approach by choosing either the day of the G8 ￿nance ministers meeting or the day of heads of
state meeting, depending on which day has the highest the number of news related to the initiative
reported by the international press according to Factiva Newsplus. The number of this news around
those days and around the days of the annual meetings of the World Bank and IMF is presented in
Figure 1. It shows that the announcements made following the meetings of the Heads of State and
Government of G8 countries are those that receive the most press coverage. Therefore, the following
days are consider as benchmark announcement dates for the major initiatives: June 27, 1997 for the
original HIPC initiative, June 18 for the enhanced HIPC, and July 8, 2005 for the MDRI. Results
6Unlike the HIPC Initiative, the MDRI is not comprehensive in its creditor coverage and does not involve par-
ticipation by o￿cial bilateral or commercial creditors, or of multilateral institutions other than the above-mentioned
three.
7considering the September dates will be discussed in the robustness analysis.
The process for countries reaching decision and completion points under the HIPC initiative also
entails various steps, such as the preparation of a debt sustainability analysis, and a series of World
Bank and IMF discussions of whether a country meets or is progressing towards the conditions
for each milestone. However, since most of these discussions are technical and take place within
multilateral institutions, I consider as event-dates for these country speci￿c events the day when
the Board of Governors of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund o￿cially announces
that a country reaches any of these milestones , as documented in the Country Report Documents
of the HIPC initiative.7
Figure 2 shows the distribution of multilateral debt relief events, including the announcement
of major initiatives as well as decision and completion points for bene￿ted countries. As previously
mentioned, just a few countries reach decision or completion points between 1996 (the year of the
launching of the original HIPC initiative) and 1999, but there is a clear cluster of countries reaching
decision point shortly after the announcement of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.
3 Methodology and Data
Under the assumption that the stock returns of multinational parent companies operating in HIPC
countries respond to events a￿ecting their subsidiaries, and that the value of these subsidiaries is not
negatively correlated with the economic performance of the host country, a standard event study that
quanti￿es the impact of multilateral debt relief announcements on the stock prices of multinational
companies operating in HIPC eligible countries provides indirect evidence of the overall impact of
multilateral debt relief on the economic performance of receiving countries. This paper implements
such a study focusing on the stock prices of South African multinationals operating in African HIPC
eligible countries, and testing the hypothesis that these announcements convey positive news for
these companies. To this end, the parameters of the following augmented two-factor return model
are estimated:8
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where Ri;t is the stock return of company i between trading days t   1 and t, RM
t and RI
i;t are
the market return and the return of company i’s industry during the same period, respectively,
Sl
i;t is a dummy variable that controls for the impact of corporate events and takes the value 1
if corporate-event type l a￿ected company i in day t, D;t is an event-time dummy variable that
indicates whether a multilateral debt relief event bene￿ting a subsidiary of parent company i occurs
7Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/index.asp
8A multi-factor model is used instead of the classic market model because it improves the ￿t, reducing the variance
of the residuals and increasing the power of tests based on those residuals; adding the corporate events also contributes
to this end. The third factor typically considered in multifactor models cannot be included, however, because there
are no data on size indexes for the earlier years of the sample.
8at time t and takes the value 1 when t equals  and zero otherwise, with  between t1 > t0 and
t2;which denote the beginning and end of the event window in calendar time, and i;t is an error term
that is correlated across ￿rms in a given day but assumed independent across days. The parameters
, , , , and  are coe￿cients to be estimated. The coe￿cients of interest are the  associated
with the event-time dummies, which capture the abnormal returns of the company during the event
window.
Under the hypothesis that the event under study has a positive impact on parent companies’
returns, the  coe￿cients should be signi￿cantly positive around or immediately after the event
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should be signi￿cantly increasing during the event window. The event study literature typically
privileges the analysis of the CAR because the cumulative impact of the events is easier to visualize;
this convention is followed in the rest of the paper.
Two aspects of this identi￿cation strategy deserve further discussion. First, the impact of events
a￿ecting a subsidiary on the value of its parent company depends on the relative importance of the
former for parent’s earnings. If the subsidiary is small relatively to the parent, even a large change
in the its value will result in a small change in parent’s returns that may be hard to separate from
normal return ￿uctuations using statistical procedures. This means that tests based on the response
of parents’ returns could have low power, which would tend to bias the results against ￿nding a
signi￿cant abnormal return as a result of the events under consideration. This is precisely the reason
for this paper’s focus on South African multinationals with operations in HIPC countries, which
are smaller than other multinationals operating in these countries. For instance, the median assets
of South African multinationals operating in Ghana were about US$ 8 bn in 2006. In contrast,
the largest multinationals operating in Ghana in various industries are Royal Dutch Shell PLC.,
Barclays PLC., and Nestle SA., all with hundreds of billions of dollars in assets. Furthermore, the
reduced power of standard estimation can be signi￿cantly improved by complementing standard
results with non-parametric tests with better power properties in small and non-normal samples.
Second, event studies rely on the e￿cient market assumption that news that impacts the value of the
￿rm is quickly incorporated in stock prices. This assumption requires transparent and liquid stock
markets. While the JSE is smaller in absolute terms and more illiquid than developed countries’
stock markets, it is one of the largest emerging stock markets, with a market capitalization of 1.6
times its GDP￿much larger than that of countries like the US, and also one of the most liquid, with
a market turnover value similar to Singapore. Moreover, South Africa fares well among emerging
markets in terms of investor rights and corporate governance indexes, with a creditor rights index
of 3 out of 4 according to Djankov et al. (2007), and an active program to improve corporate
governance.
Information on parent-subsidiary relations comes mainly from McGregor (2006) Who Owns
9Whom South Africa, which reports all South African companies with operations in other African
countries at the end of 2006. This publication enumerates the subsidiaries and operations of each
South African multinational and reports partial information on the date of initial investment, hold-
ings, and number of employees in each subsidiary. From it, all ￿rms listed in the JSE, and with
operations or subsidiaries in African HIPC eligible countries during the period of the initiatives
(1995-2006) were selected, to obtain a sample of 35 companies with 187 subsidiaries in 26 coun-
tries. This information was complemented and checked with data from United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (1993, 2004), Graham and Whiteside (1997-2004), Lexis-Nexis (2007),
business-press reports relating parent and subsidiaries in Lexis-Nexis and Factiva-Newsplus, and in-
formation requests directly sent to South African companies identi￿ed as having a￿liates in eligible
African HIPC countries.9
The date of initial investment in subsidiaries located in African HIPC countries reveals whether
a parent company is a￿ected by a speci￿c debt relief event. For instance, only companies with active
subsidiaries in African HIPC-eligible countries in June 1996 are considered as a￿ected by the original
HIPC initiative announcement. Table 2 presents the list of parent companies with investments in
African countries that have been eligible for the HIPC initiative since 1996 and the median size
in assets and sales of these companies at the end of 2006. The ￿nal row of the table displays the
average of each measure across companies. Both assets and sales of parents are at about US$ 2 bn,
and the average parent company has about 4 subsidiaries. Parent companies with interests in HIPC
countries are also homogeneously distributed across industries, as shown in Table 3. Utilities are
the only industry where no South African company has a￿liates in other African HIPC countries.
Stock returns and corporate-event data for the selected parent companies were obtained from
Bloomberg. The market return is based on the JSE All Shares Index and the industry return
associated to each parent is that of the FT JSE Index of the industry of the primary activity
of the parent company, both also obtained from Bloomberg. The fraction of parent companies
with available return data has increased during the period, but even in 1996 there are return data
available for more than 70 percent of the ￿rms. Corporate event data included in Sl
i;t comprise the
following corporate action types: capital changes, corporate events, and distributions, all as de￿ned
by Bloomberg.10
In the benchmark results, the parameters of the model are estimated using estimation and
event windows of 180 and 15 calendar days before each event, roughly corresponding to 112 and 10
market-trading days, respectively, and using lumped returns. 11 Nevertheless, results for di￿erent
estimation windows, event windows, and using trade-to-trade returns to control for thin-trading are
presented below as robustness checks.
9A letter was sent to each parent company with missing information requesting data on initial investment date
and size of subsidiaries, reaching a response rate of about 30 percent.
10The following speci￿c corporate actions are included: Acquired, Acquisition, Cash Dividend, Corporate Meeting,
Debt O￿ering-New Issue, De-listing, Divestiture, Equity O￿ering, Fiscal Year End, Change ID, Number Change,
Listing Name, Change Par Value, Change Rights O￿erings, Stock Buyback, Stock Dividend, Stock Split, and Ticker
Symbol Change.
11This means that during periods of inactivity all returns are assigned to the ￿rst day in which there is new activity.
10The econometric model described in equation (1) deals with the clustering of the events under
consideration in calendar time and the resulting potential cross-￿rm correlation of returns by allow-
ing the error term i;t to have a calendar-time component. This means that the estimated standard
errors of the parameters correct for the reduced degrees of freedom by clustering the errors in the
calendar-time dimension of the data. This procedure is similar to the standard approach followed
in the event-study literature that uses a portfolio of ￿rms to control for the potential correlation
introduced by the clustering of the events and performing inference based only on the time variation
of the average abnormal returns, but it is more e￿cient. Other than correcting for this clustering
and for potential heteroskedasticity, across the paper, all parameters are estimated by Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS).12
Non-parametric tests of the hypothesis that the announcements have a positive impact on par-
ent company returns, which have better power in small samples and under non-normality (Corrado,
1989; Campbell and Wasley, 1996), can be constructed from a simple variation of the model de-
scribed in equation (1) that does not include the event-time dummies and whose parameters are
estimated only over the estimation window. With the parameters estimated in this manner, the
abnormal returns for each ￿rm during the event and estimation windows are computed as
^ i;t = Ri;t   ^ i + ^ iRM







These abnormal returns are used to construct two non-parametric tests frequently employed in the
literature: the Corrado (1989) rank test, and the Corrado and Zivney (1992) sign test. The Corrado
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Ki;t = rank(^ i;t) t 2 [t0;t2];
where 0:5  (t2   t0 + 1) is the expected value of the rank. The numerator  Kt is the mean rank
deviation of abnormal returns at event time t, and (  K) is the standard deviation of this mean.
Under the assumption that abnormal returns are independent across time, this statistic follows a
standard normal distribution, and the hypothesis that the median rank deviation of the abnormal
returns at a given time ,  K, is statistically di￿erent from zero can be tested by applying standard
normal critical values to the statistic T. As in the case of the abnormal returns, the ￿gures presented
below will show the cumulative mean rank deviation computed by adding the mean rank deviations
during the event window, and whose standard deviation is obtained under the assumption that
mean rank deviations are i.i.d. (Campbell and Wasley (1996)).
The Corrado and Zivney (1992) sign test follows a similar logic as the rank test, but focuses
12Results using the standard portfolio approach are similar to those reported here and available upon request.
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1 if sign(^ i;t) > 0
0 if sign(^ i;t) = 0
 1 if sign(^ i;t) < 0
;
where (  G) is the standard deviation of the mean  Gt, which should be zero under the null hypothesis
that the event has no impact on returns. The cumulative mean sign deviations and their standard
deviations, reported in various ￿gures, are computed in the same manner as the cumulative mean
rank deviations.
4 Results
This section presents the results of the event study analysis of the impact of multilateral debt relief
announcements described above. It ￿rst describes the results obtained for the major debt relief
initiatives, followed by those obtained for country-level debt relief announcements (decision and
completion points). Results from parametric and non-parametric tests and robustness analysis are
presented in each case.
4.1 Major Debt Relief Initiatives
The evolution of the estimated cumulative abnormal return \ CAR for the three major debt relief
initiatives, in an event window of 10 trading days around the event date is reported in Table 4
and depicted in the various panels of Figure 3, along their 90 percent con￿dence bands . Panel A
shows the CAR obtained by pooling the three major initiatives, and panels B to D display the CAR
separately estimated for the HIPC initiative, enhanced HIPC initiative, and MDRI, respectively.
The announcement of a major debt relief initiative is associated with a statistically signi￿cant
increase in the CAR of about one percentage point (Panel A in Figure 3). While cumulative
abnormal returns are 10 basis points three days before the announcement, they increase to 140 basis
points one day after the announcement (Column (1) of Table 4). Considering that parent companies
are large relative to their subsidiaries, this increase is economically signi￿cant and suggests a much
larger increase in the underlying value of the a￿liates. For instance, if a parent company’s operations
in all HIPC countries represent 10 percent of its overall value (roughly the median ratio of subsidiary
to parent employment in the data), a one percent increase in the value of the parent company is
12consistent with a 10 percent increase in the value of those operations. 13 The results, therefore,
indicate that the announcement of major debt relief initiatives conveys positive news for South
African multinational companies with a￿liates in eligible African HIPC countries that translate in
an abnormal increase in their share returns.
The ￿gures in Panels B to D show that there is heterogeneity in the response to the di￿erent
major debt relief initiatives. The announcement of the original HIPC initiative does not have a
signi￿cant impact on the returns of parent companies (Panel B). So, apparently ￿nancial markets
did not perceive this announcement as a￿ecting the valuation of parent companies with ongoing
operations in HIPC eligible countries. However, this evidence has to be taken with caution because
in the data there are only 10 South African parent companies with activities in HIPC countries in
1996. On the contrary, the announcement of the Enhanced HIPC initiative and the MDRI results
in a statistically signi￿cant increase in cumulative abnormal returns of about two percentage points
(Panels C and D). The CAR increases from -30 basis points three days before the announcement of
the Enhanced HIPC to 150 basis points the day of the announcement. In the case of the MDRI, the
CAR rose from -20 basis points three days before the event to 140 basis points the day after it, and
climbed to 200 basis points ten days after the announcement of the initiative. These results support
the hypothesis that markets considered the last two major debt relief initiatives as signi￿cantly
positive news for parent companies with operations in eligible countries.
The conclusions about the impact of major debt relief initiatives on the pattern of cumulative
abnormal returns are robust to changes in the length of the estimation and event windows. Results
for di￿erent estimation windows are summarized in the various panels of Figure 4, where the bold
lines depict the evolution of the baseline estimates of the CAR￿obtained with an estimation window
of 112 trading days, and the thin lines display the evolution of the CAR for smaller estimation
windows ranging from 52 to 102 trading days, in increments of 10. The shaded area corresponds
to the envelope of the estimated patterns, and the crosses mark whether the CAR are statistically
signi￿cant. It is clear in the ￿gures that the pattern of the CAR does not vary importantly with
the reduction of the estimation window, especially for the Enhanced HIPC and MDRI, where not
only the sequence of CAR evolves similarly regardless of the estimation window, but also the range
spanned by the di￿erent estimates does not deviate importantly from the baseline results. 14
Changing the length of the event window from the baseline level of 10 trading days around
the event to 5 and 20 trading days does not qualitatively change the evolution of the CAR either,
as shown in Figure 5. The level of the CAR varies with the length of the window around the
announcement of the original HIPC initiative, but the pattern and level of CAR for all major
initiatives together, as well as those for the Enhanced HIPC and MDRI, are largely una￿ected by
these changes in length.
13This is because the total value of the multinational equals the sum of the value of their subsidiaries. Thus,
a percentage increase in the value of a subsidiary creates a percentage increase in the value of the parent that is
proportional to the fraction of the total value represented by the subsidiary.
14Results for longer windows are not reported because the benchmark value is at the long end of values used with
daily data, but the results remain una￿ected.
13The baseline results are also robust to changes in the sample of parent companies. This is shown
in Figure 6 that summarizes the distribution of the sequence of CAR obtained after dropping one
parent company at a time. At each event time, the ￿gure shows the mean, 25th percentile, 75th
percentile, minimum and maximum CAR estimated for that date, and marks in gray the area
spanned between the minimum and maximum estimated CAR. Except for the original HIPC
initiative, where each ￿rm represents 10 percent of the sample, the distribution of the CAR at each
event day is tightly concentrated around the mean value, which indicates that the pattern depicted
in the baseline results is not driven by any individual parent company.
The positive impact of major debt relief announcements indicated by the evolution of cumulative
abnormal returns is supported by the results of non-parametric rank and sign tests with better
power in small samples with non-normal returns than standard parametric tests. The evolution of
the mean rank deviations  Kt during each day of the event window is reported in columns (1) to (4)
of Table 5 for all major initiatives, HIPC, Enhanced HIPC, and MDRI, respectively. Similarly to
the parametric tests based on the CAR, the mean rank deviations take a positive and statistically
signi￿cant value within one day of the event date, except for the original HIPC initiative of 1996.
Furthermore, in the three events where signi￿cant rank deviations are found, there is no other
positive signi￿cant rank deviation within the event window, which further supports the association
of these abnormally high returns with the event under consideration. The magnitude of the rank
deviations, between 11 and 18, are also economically signi￿cant. They indicate that the ranks of
the CAR in those dates are at least 10 places higher than what would be expected by chance, which
corresponds to 20 percent of the expected rank value.15 These changes in the rank of abnormal
returns are clearly displayed in panels A to D of Figure 7 that exhibits the cumulative mean rank
deviations during the event window and their 90 percent con￿dence bands. Except for the ￿gure in
Panel B corresponding to the original HIPC initiative, the rank deviations documented in Table 5
are large enough to induce a clear and signi￿cant break in the cumulative values.
Similar results are obtained for the median sign deviations  G, whose evolution within the event
window is reported in Table 6 and depicted in Figure 8 in cumulative form. Again, except for the
original HIPC initiative, the results exhibit positive and signi￿cant deviations immediately after the
event date. After the announcement, abnormal returns are much more likely to be positive than
expected by chance. As in the case of parametric tests, these ￿ndings are robust to variations in
the estimation windows (not reported).
The lack of signi￿cant results for the original HIPC initiative with these non-parametric tests
with better power than parametric tests in small samples of ￿rms, and in cases of non-normally
distributed returns, as shown by Corrado (1989) and Campbell and Wasley (1996), makes unlikely
that the lack of impact of the original HIPC on parent companies’ returns stems from the small
number of ￿rms under consideration, and supports instead the view that the original initiative did
not have a noticeable impact on these parent companies indirectly a￿ected. One could conjecture
that this lack of impact could arise from the requirements that eligible countries had to meet under
15Based on the length of the windows the expected rank is 66.
14the original HIPC initiative to begin receiving some form of relief, which the markets could have
anticipated were not going to be met by a broad set of countries, although, of course, this remains
to be proven.
Although the JSE is nowadays a liquid emerging stock market, it was considerably smaller
and less liquid in 1996, just a few years after the end of the apartheid and international and
domestic restrictions to capital ￿ows. This means that thin-trading and the resulting volatility and
non-normality of returns can be a serious problem in earlier years, although the listing of smaller
companies in later years may also result in the presence of illiquid stocks in the ￿nal part of the
sample. To check if this problem is driving the results, the CAR were also estimated after correcting
for thin-trading by computing trade-to-trade returns, as suggested by Maynes and Rumsey (1993).
The sequences of the various estimated CAR, depicted in Figure 9, show that the baseline results
are not fundamentally a￿ected by the illiquidity of some stocks.
The baseline results reported above consider as event dates the announcements of debt relief
initiative taking place in the Summit Meetings of Heads of State and Government of the G8.
Nevertheless, as discussed in section 2, the details of the initiatives￿including the eligibility criteria,
were typically sorted out during the following Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors of the
World Bank and IMF taking place in September of the same year. It is, therefore, possible that some
valuable information a￿ecting the returns of companies with interests in HIPC countries could be
released around these dates instead. To check for this possibility, the evolution of the CAR was also
estimated around the dates of the World Bank and IMF Annual Meetings reported in Table 1. The
results, presented in Figure 10, do not show much evidence of a break in the pattern of abnormal
returns around these alternative event dates, except in the case of the enhanced HIPC initiative
(Panel C). There is some evidence of a signi￿cant increase in CAR just before the announcement
of the original HIPC initiative (Panel B), but this result is not robust to the consideration of
thin-trading issues (not reported). When pooling all major initiatives together (Panel A), as well
as when looking at the MDRI (Panel D), there is no signi￿cant impact on the sequence of CAR
around the annual meetings’ dates. The results, therefore, tend to indicate that the announcements
of the launching of the various initiatives by the heads of state of industrial countries are the ones
that are considered as good news for ￿rms with operations in HIPC countries by ￿nancial markets,
suggesting that for the most part, ￿nancial markets assume that once those announcements are
made, the details of the implementation are of second order importance.
4.2 Country Level Announcements
The impact of the announcements of major debt relief initiatives on parent companies with oper-
ations in HIPC eligible countries indicates that markets believe these countries will eventually get
debt relief. However, at the time of these announcements, there is still uncertainty about whether
and when a speci￿c country will meet the conditions for HIPC and MDRI relief. This uncertainty is
resolved as countries advance through the HIPC process and reach decision and completion points.
So, the formal announcement of a country reaching one of these milestones could in principle a￿ect
15the returns of a related parent company. The following results test for this possibility.
The estimated sequences of cumulative abnormal returns for decision and completion point
events during a 10 trading-day event window, along with their 90 percent con￿dence bands are
depicted in panels A and B of Figure 11, respectively. The ￿gures show no signi￿cant increase in
CAR around the event dates for decision or completion points. However, in both cases the CAR
exhibits a pre-event decreasing trend that stops and slightly reverse around the announcement dates,
and could indicate some degree of market response to the announcements. Looking separately at
decision and completion points reached under the HIPC and Enhanced HIPC does not signi￿cantly
a￿ect the results (not reported). In sum, parametric tests o￿er little support to the hypothesis that
the resolution of the uncertainty about a country getting debt relief impacts the stock returns of
parent companies with a￿liates in that country.
Non-parametric tests, however, are more supportive of the hypothesis that these announcements
have some e￿ect on stock returns. The estimated mean rank deviations and mean sign deviations of
the rank and sign-tests statistics for decision and completion points are reported in Table 8. Both
tests produce positive and statistically signi￿cant statistics at the date of the announcement of a
completion point and immediately after it (between dates 0 and 2, see columns (2) and (4)). Since
these tests are better able to deal with the non-normality associated with trends in the abnormal
returns around the events (momentum) and are also more powerful than parametric tests, they
provide more robust evidence than parametric tests based on the estimated CAR. The magnitude
of the increases in rank and sign statistics is, however, smaller than that estimated for the major
initiatives (Tables 5 and 6). The rank of abnormal returns is at most 8 places higher around a
completion point than expected by chance, compared with at least 10 for major initiatives. The
mean sign deviation is also smaller, reaching values of about 0.2 instead of the 0.4 obtained for
major initiatives.
In summary, while the evidence cannot reject the hypothesis that the announcement of a com-
pletion point has some positive impact on the returns of parent companies with a￿liates in the
bene￿ted country, the size of the impact is small compared with that of major initiatives. This is
not surprising considering that country level announcements a￿ect parent companies only through
their operations in that individual country, while major initiatives impact them through their op-
erations in all eligible countries. It seems that the breadth of the impact of major initiatives
compensates for the remaining uncertainty about the timing of debt relief to speci￿c countries to
induce movements in the returns of parent companies.
4.3 Does the Intensity of Exposure Matter?
The baseline results are based on identifying abnormal returns of parent companies with operations
in HIPC countries controlling for market and industry movements, but do not exploit variation in the
exposure to the events across parents. Any two South African multinationals with operations in a
HIPC country at the time of an announcement are considered as exposed to the event regardless the
size of their operations. However, to the extent that the abnormal returns documented above result
16from an improvement in the prospects of exposed companies, one would expect parent companies
with relatively larger interests in HIPC eligible countries to bene￿t relatively more from the events.
Therefore, di￿erences in the intensity of exposure to the event can be used to build an additional test
of the hypothesis that the stock price response to the announcements comes from their signi￿cance
for ￿rms’ prospects, and to provide further support to the mechanism behind the results.
To build this test I construct a measure of the exposure of a parent company to a HIPC event
by computing the ratio of the total employment of its a￿ected a￿liates to the parent’s total number
of employees. The focus on employment as a size measure instead of assets is for data availability
reasons; while data on parent company’s assets is easy to obtain, most subsidiaries only report
employment data to McGregor (2006). Employment data for those subsidiaries with some available
information is typically obtainable only for 2005-2006, so subsidiary employment is considered as
a ￿xed subsidiary characteristic and is normalized by parent total employment data for the same
year. Based on these data, a parent’s company exposure to an announcement at time t is computed
as the ratio of the total employment of all its subsidiaries operating in bene￿ted countries at that
moment, to the parent’s total employment. Recognizing that this measure is likely to contain an
important amount of noise because of the assumptions required to extend the sample coverage, the
￿nal measure does not exploit the continuous nature of this exposure indicator but instead classi￿es
parent companies in two groups depending on whether its exposure indicator is above or below the
median level, and compare the behavior of the abnormal returns across these two groups.
The evolution of the CAR for parent companies with relatively high and low exposure is reported
in panels A and B of Figure 12. Panel C reports the evolution of the di￿erential e￿ect of the exposure
on these CARs and their 90 percent con￿dence bands. The response of CAR in parent companies
with relatively higher exposure to the events is clearly larger than that of less exposed companies (see
Panels A and B). Moreover, this di￿erence is signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero at conventional levels
immediately after the event. As shown in Panel C, which exhibits the evolution of the di￿erence in
CAR for ￿rms with relatively high exposure, the CAR of these ￿rms increases clearly more than
that of ￿rms with low exposure.
The results reported in this section show that returns of multinational ￿rms with relatively
larger interests in countries bene￿ted by multilateral debt relief increase relatively more after the
announcements of these initiatives. This ￿nding provides strong support to the hypothesis that the
abnormal returns for parent companies exposed to debt relief events in the baseline estimates are a
consequence of the market’s assessment that the events convey positive news for the value of these
companies. Results in the next section further explore the reasons behind these assessments.
4.4 Economic Prospects versus Future Taxation
As discussed in the introduction, debt relief can increase the value of ￿rms with operations in
bene￿ted countries by leading to higher growth, aggregate demand, and ￿rms’ gross pro￿ts, and
by reducing expected future taxation and increasing after-tax pro￿ts. This section presents results
aimed to disentangle what of these channels is most likely to be responsible for the stock return
17response of parent companies. To this end, it separately looks at the impact of the announcements
of major initiatives on the returns of parent companies operating in industries that are likely to
have di￿erent sensitivities to taxation and economic prospects.
Resource extraction is typically considered an enclave industry, whose rents are readily taxed,
and even expropriated, especially so if they are foreign owned (Engel and Fischer (2008)), and
investment and production in these industries is sensitive to ownership risk (Bohn and Deacon
(2000)). Also, resource extraction produces commodities sold in global markets, so gross pro￿ts in
this industry depend little on the economic growth of the host country. Thus, it can be expected
that this industry would bene￿t relatively more by a reduction in expected future taxes than by
an improvement in future economic conditions. On the contrary, the performance of ￿rms in non-
tradable service industries depends mainly on local economic conditions and, at the same time, for
political economy reasons, these industries may be a less tempting target for taxes because they tend
to be more labor intensive. Therefore, the di￿erential response of stock returns of parent companies
operating in resource extraction versus companies operating in services can be used to test whether
the positive stock return impact of major announcements documented above comes mainly from the
market’s assessment of better economic prospects for the bene￿ted countries or from a reduction in
expected taxes.
The evolution of cumulative abnormal returns and their corresponding 90 percent con￿dence
bands for companies in resource extraction and service industries, as well as the di￿erence in CAR
between these two industries during a 10-day window around the announcement of major initiatives
is reported in Figure 13. The ￿gure shows that the CAR experiences a larger and more signi￿cant
increase around the event day for parent companies in resource extraction (Panel A) than in services
(Panel B). While the CAR of resource companies reaches ￿ve percentage points and is statistically
signi￿cant at 10 percent level since day zero, those of service companies only climb up to one
percentage point and is statistically signi￿cant at 12 percent. This di￿erential response can be
clearly seen in Panel C, which shows that CAR of companies in resource industries is higher than
those of companies in service industries, and that this di￿erence is signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero
in various post event dates (days, 3, 7, and 8)
Thus, under the assumption that stock prices of companies in resource extraction industries are
relatively more responsive to expected taxation than those of companies in the service sector, the
stronger positive stock returns’ response of the former relative to the latter suggests that the posi-
tive market response to announcements of major debt relief initiatives documented in the baseline
estimates is mostly due to an expected reduction in future taxation rather than improved economic
prospects.
The evidence in Figure 13 also helps to dispel the possibility that the abnormal returns could
come from ￿rms in non-tradable industries bene￿ting from a real appreciation resulting from the
increase in net aid in￿ows associated with debt relief (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005a; Rajan and
Subramanian, 2005b). However, if this mechanism were driving the results, the resource producing
industries, which are tradable, should experience a smaller abnormal stock price response than
18non-tradable industries, exactly the opposite of what is found in the data.
5 Conclusions
There has been considerable attention in recent years on the debt problems faced by poor countries,
and numerous calls for debt relief coming from all sectors of society, and from actors ranging from
the religious leaders to rock stars. These calls have been based on arguments ranging from the moral
wrong of rich countries collecting debt from people at the brink of starvation, to the economic costs
of debt overhang, and have encompassed issues such as the ￿ght against poverty and the irrationality
of permanently rolling over multilateral loans (ever-greening).
This paper has focused on the economic rationale for debt relief and looked for evidence that mul-
tilateral debt relief initiatives improve the economic prospects of bene￿ted countries. In contrast to
existing literature, this is done by conducting an event study to overcome the standard econometric
problems of estimating aggregate relations between debt relief and macroeconomic performance.
The evidence presented in the paper overwhelmingly indicates that the announcement of multi-
lateral debt relief initiatives conveys good news for receiving countries according to ￿nancial market’s
views. The stock return of ￿rms with a￿liates in these countries experiences an statistically and
economically signi￿cant. abnormal increase around the dates of the formal announcements of the
initiatives This increase is larger for ￿rms with relatively larger interests in receiving countries and
seems to come from the perception that future taxes will be lower as a result of debt relief. Although
indirect, this evidence supports the debt overhang argument for debt relief.
As in any empirical exercise, there are caveats to keep in mind despite the strength of the evidence
. First, the results directly show that multinationals operating in bene￿ted countries bene￿t, most
likely because their subsidiaries bene￿t. The interpretation that the country as a whole bene￿ts
depends on these ￿rm’s value to be positively correlated with the state of the country’s economy
and, while plausible, remains an unproven assumption. Second, the results in this paper indicate
that the bene￿t is quantitatively meaningful from the point of view of parents and subsidiaries, but
even if the country as a whole bene￿ts, the size of the e￿ect will surely di￿er from my estimations.
The evidence presented here has to be considered as highly indicative of the presence of a positive
impact of debt relief rather than a quanti￿cation of that impact. As it is almost always the case,
the bene￿ts of this approach in terms of cleaner identi￿cation are weighed by the cost of separating
from the immediate object of interests, namely the aggregate growth e￿ect of these initiatives.
Finally, an event study methodology exploits, by construction, the local variation of the data to
identify the consequences of a speci￿c event; everything occurring outside the event windows is
considered as potentially contaminated by other developments. This is, of course, an untested
identi￿cation assumption. It is, therefore, impossible to know within this framework whether the
￿nancial market’s views of the consequences of these initiatives have remained in time or reversed
as a result of further news.
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The proposal of the HIPC Initiative was accepted, except the
idea of IMF's gold sales to finance debt relief, which
Germany strongly opposed. Options for financing is yet to be
finalized.
September 29 - 30, 1996
b
The HIPC Initiative is approved by the IMF and the World
Bank. Agreement by the G-7 nations to increase debt
cancellation from 67 per cent (decided in Naples Terms in
1994) to a maximum of 80 per cent is followed by the
approval of the Initiative.
June 18, 1999
c
An amendment of the HIPC Initiative is agreed.
September 27, 2003
Enhanced HIPC Approved by the IMF and the World Bank.
July 8, 2005
d
As much as 100% debt cancellation for the HIPCs owed to
the World Bank, the IMF and the African Development
Bank is committed by G8 nations.
September 26, 2005
e
The IMF and the World Bank agree to endorse 100 percent
debt cancellation for the HIPCs.
a. Source: Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 28, 1996
b. Source: Financial Times (London, England), September 30, 1996
c. Source: The Independent (London), June 19, 1999
d. Source: World Markets Analysis, July 11, 2005
Table 1. Chronology of HIPC Initiatives and MDRI
G8 summit in Lyon, France
Annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank
e. Source: World Markets Analysis, September 27, 2005, and Agence France Presse,
G8 Summit in Cologne, Germany
Annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank
G8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland
Annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank
22Parent company
Aveng LTD 1,491.44 2,239.69 9
Alexander Forbes LTD 19,527.85 812.93 7
AECI LTD 1,161.01 1,125.71 7
African Life Assurance Company LTD 2,078.34 484.41 10
Afgri LTD 914.87 794.40 1
African Oxygen LTD 590.26 504.79 4
Anglogold Ashanti LTD 9,326.19 2,999.26 8
African Rainbow Minerals LTD 2,176.20 688.41 13
Astral Foods LTD 323.54 772.07 1
ABSA Group LTD 73,743.23 8,109.47 3
Barloworld LTD 5,310.40 6,358.80 8
Business Connexion Group LTD 355.93 477.76 3
Bell Equipment LTD 304.18 526.24 3
BHP Billiton plc 7,226.10 4,788.95 1
Bidvest Group LTD, the 4,169.57 11,509.75 11
First Rand LTD 86,354.93 10,718.55 2
Gold fields LTD 4,711.83 2,175.26 2
Grindrod LTD 1,082.87 1,862.86 10
Illovo sugar LTD 690.39 887.80 4
Imperial Holdings LTD 5,594.28 8,058.53 4
Massmart Holdings LTD 1,432.59 4,462.85 6
MTN Group LTD 14,435.06 4,597.84 8
Metorex LTD 241.50 226.77 1
Nedbank Group LTD 63,287.46 7,060.32 1
Nampak LTD 1,852.19 2,311.11 12
Sabmiller PLC 4,038.58 1,843.61 14
Standard Bank Group LTD 144,324.00 12,215.52 8
Steinhoff International Holdings LTD 4,745.42 4,801.66 2
Shoprite Holdings LTD 1,480.85 4,991.26 10
Santam LTD 2,504.62 1,727.59 2
Sasol LTD 15,364.61 12,272.12 6
Sun International LTD 1,119.18 886.06 1
Tongaat-Hulett Group LTD, the 1,348.82 1,118.10 1
Tourism Investment Corporation LTD 138.23 195.87 1
Unitrans LTD 756.33 1,996.00 3
Median 2,078.34 1,996.00 4.00
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Parent Companies
Assets and annual sales of the parent companies are from the latest available of the 2005 or 2006 fiscal year.
Source: Bloomberg, Worldscope, and the Major Companies Database.




















The number of parent companies is the average
for the period 2001-2007. A company's industry
classification comes from FTSE/JSE African Index
series. Source: Bloomberg.
24Event day CAR CAR CAR CAR
-10 0.002 0.003 0.017*** 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001
-9 0.002 0.003 0.021*** 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002* 0.001
-8 0.001 0.003 0.024*** 0.002 -0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.001
-7 0.000 0.004 0.022*** 0.002 -0.010*** 0.004 0.001 0.001
-6 0.001 0.004 0.023*** 0.003 -0.010** 0.004 0.002 0.002
-5 0.003 0.006 0.021*** 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.002
-4 0.002 0.006 0.018*** 0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.001 0.002
-3 0.001 0.006 0.019*** 0.004 -0.003 0.006 -0.002 0.003
-2 0.006 0.007 0.017*** 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.003
-1 0.010 0.007 0.016*** 0.005 0.018** 0.007 0.003 0.003
0 0.009 0.008 0.009* 0.005 0.015** 0.008 0.005 0.003
1 0.014* 0.008 0.011* 0.006 0.016* 0.008 0.014*** 0.004
2 0.013 0.008 0.011* 0.006 0.012 0.009 0.015*** 0.004
3 0.011 0.008 0.015** 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.013*** 0.004
4 0.014* 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.010 0.018*** 0.005
5 0.014 0.009 0.014* 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.017*** 0.005
6 0.013 0.009 0.016* 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.014*** 0.005
7 0.014 0.009 0.017* 0.009 0.013 0.011 0.015*** 0.005
8 0.012 0.010 0.017* 0.009 0.003 0.012 0.017*** 0.006
9 0.011 0.010 0.019* 0.010 -0.001 0.013 0.018*** 0.006
10 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.001 0.014 0.020*** 0.006
Number of
firms
In each panel, columns labeled CAR report the cummulative abnormal returns (CARs) of South African multinational
companies with operations in countries elegible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives for each trading
trading day within a 10-day event-window. CAR are based on abnormal returns estimated from a two factor model using
an estimation window of 112 trading days. Standard errors correct for the clustering of the events in calendar time.
Panel (1) report results obtained by pooling all major initiatives together, and Panels (2), (3), and (4) separately present
similar results for the HIPC initiative, the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event dates considered for each of
these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the G-8 summit held on June 27, 1996, June 18, 1999, and July
8, 2005. The row labeled Number of firms report the number of companies over which abnormal returns are computed in
each ocasion.
***, **, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.
Table 4. Evolution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Three Major Initiative Events
All major events Enhanced HIPC Initiative HIPC Initiative MDRI









68 10 23 35
25Event day
-10 3.5 38.3*** -1.0 -3.6
-9 4.7 11.3 1.2 5.2
-8 -0.6 5.3 -4.6 0.3
-7 -4.3 -0.9 -16.0** 2.4
-6 2.0 5.9 1.8 1.0
-5 -0.9 -9.7 10.3 -5.7
-4 -0.6 -8.6 -4.0 3.9
-3 2.0 7.0 3.3 -0.4
-2 1.8 -6.7 -0.7 5.8
-1 6.7 -6.6 12.5* 6.7
0 1.5 -18.4 5.1 4.9
1 10.9** -4.0 6.2 18.2**
2 6.6 6.2 9.2 5.0
3 -5.5 2.8 -6.8 -7.0
4 5.0 -15.6 6.2 10.2
5 3.9 15.2 1.4 2.3
6 -1.5 2.4 1.0 -4.2
7 4.1 -2.0 5.6 4.8
8 -2.0 7.2 -14.2** 3.3
9 2.6 10.0 -4.8 5.5
10 -1.0 -19.2 2.8 1.8
Number of firms 68 10 23 35
Table 5. Rank test: Three Major Initiative Events
Each column reports the sequence of mean rank deviations of abnormal returns during a 10 trading day
window around each event and indicators of the significance of the test that each of those differences is equal to
zero. Mean rank deviations were computed based on abnormal returns estimated over an estimation window of
112 trading days before the beginning of the 10-day event window. Event dates considered for the HIPC
Initiative, the Enhanced HIPC Initiative and the MDRI, correspond to the G-8 summits held on June 27, 1996;
June 18, 1999; and July 8, 2005, respectively.
***, **, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean rank deviation





-10 0.15 0.80** 0.04 0.03
-9 0.06 0.40 -0.04 0.03
-8 -0.12 0.00 -0.04 -0.20
-7 -0.21 -0.20 -0.48** -0.03
-6 0.12 0.20 0.04 0.14
-5 -0.18 -0.80** 0.22 -0.26
-4 0.06 -0.20 0.04 0.14
-3 0.06 0.40 0.22 -0.14
-2 0.00 -0.20 -0.04 0.09
-1 0.24* 0.00 0.30 0.26
0 -0.03 -0.60* 0.13 0.03
1 0.35** 0.00 0.30 0.49***
2 0.26* 0.40 0.39* 0.14
3 -0.06 0.20 -0.13 -0.09
4 0.06 -0.60* 0.13 0.20
5 0.03 0.20 0.04 -0.03
6 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.09
7 0.12 -0.20 0.04 0.26
8 0.00 0.00 -0.30 0.20
9 0.00 0.40 -0.22 0.03
10 -0.18 -0.40 -0.04 -0.20
Number of firms 68 10 23 35
Table 6. Sign test: Three Major Initiatives
Each column reports the sequence of mean sign deviations of abnormal returns during a 10 trading day
window around each event and indicators of the significance of the test that each of those differences is
equal to zero. Mean sign deviations were computed based on the sign of abnormal returns of affected parent
companies estimated over an estimation window of 112 trading days before the beginning of the 10-day
event window. Event dates considered for the HIPC Initiative, the Enhanced HIPC Initiative and the
MDRI, correspond to the G-8 summits held on June 27, 1996; June 18, 1999; and July 8, 2005, respectively.
***, **, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively."
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean sign deviation




27Event day CAR CAR CAR CAR
-10 -0.001 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.003*** 0.000
-9 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.000 0.001
-8 0.007** 0.003 0.005** 0.002 0.014*** 0.002 0.003*** 0.001
-7 0.008** 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.014*** 0.003 0.006*** 0.001
-6 0.007* 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.012*** 0.003 0.003* 0.002
-5 0.009** 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.013*** 0.004 0.009*** 0.002
-4 0.010** 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.013*** 0.004 0.011*** 0.002
-3 0.008* 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.014*** 0.005 0.005* 0.003
-2 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.003
-1 0.000 0.006 0.010** 0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.002 0.003
0 0.003 0.008 0.011** 0.005 0.011 0.006 -0.006 0.004
1 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.022*** 0.008 -0.004 0.004
2 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.006 0.028*** 0.009 -0.006 0.004
3 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.028*** 0.009 -0.002 0.004
4 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.020** 0.010 0.000 0.005
5 0.002 0.010 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.012 -0.005 0.005
6 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.013 0.013 -0.001 0.005
7 0.004 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.013 -0.003 0.005
8 0.000 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.015 -0.006 0.006
9 0.000 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.016 -0.007 0.006







73 13 25 35









In each panel, columns labeled CAR report the cummulative abnormal returns (CARs) of South African multinational
companies with operations in countries elegible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives for each trading
trading day within a 10-day event-window. CAR are based on abnormal returns estimated from a two factor model using
an estimation window of 112 trading days. Standard errors correct for the clustering of the events in calendar time.
Panel (1) report results obtained by pooling all major initiatives together, and Panels (2), (3), and (4) separately present
similar results for the HIPC initiative, the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Official implementation dates of
the HIPC Initiative, the Enhanced HIPC Initiative and the MDRI on September 29, 1996; September 26, 1999; and
September 26, 2005; respectively. The row labeled Number of firms report the number of companies over which
abnormal returns are computed in each ocasion.






-10 0.8 0.4 -0.05 0.08
-9 0.5 -3.7 -0.11 -0.20*
-8 1.9 -1.4 0.06 -0.09
-7 3.8 -5.9 0.11 -0.17
-6 -1.3 -4.4 0.11 -0.14
-5 -1.6 -1.5 0.00 -0.07
-4 0.3 -3.5 0.02 -0.07
-3 -4.4 2.2 -0.11 -0.01
-2 -5.6 2.3 -0.12 0.11
-1 -5.2 -2.3 -0.14 -0.07
0 0.5 8.1** 0.08 0.20*
1 -5.3 -1.7 -0.06 0.02
2 5.7 6.3* 0.14 0.17
3 1.1 -2.0 0.02 -0.02
4 1.4 -0.1 0.14 0.00
5 -1.2 4.0 -0.06 0.13
6 4.3 -0.8 0.08 -0.01
7 -3.0 -5.3 -0.14 -0.17
8 4.0 2.0 0.08 -0.02
9 2.7 -2.5 0.05 -0.02
10 0.1 -1.0 -0.08 0.00
Number of firms 65 92 65 92
Table 8. Rank test. Decision and Completion Point Events
Each column reports the sequence of mean rank deviations of abnormal returns of South African
multinational companies with affiliates in benefited HIPC countries during a 10 trading day
window around each decision and completin point events, as well as indicators of the significance of
the test that each of those differences is equal to zero. Mean rank deviations were computed based
on abnormal returns estimated over a window of 112 trading days before the beginning of the 10-
day event window.
***, **, and * denote 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean rank deviation Mean sign deviation
Decision points Completion points Decision points Completion points
29C. MDRI
Figure 1. Distribution of News Related to Major Debt Relief Announcements
A. HIPC Initiative B. HIPC Enhanced HIPC Initiative
The different panels exhibit the number of press articles on the various multilateral debt relief announcements during the days around the G7 (G8) Summit Meetings where
the initiatives were launched and around the Annual Meetings of the World Bank and IMF where the details of implementation where released. Panel A exhibits the





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30The markers in the figure show the dates of announcements of decision and completion points for
African HIPC eligible countries, as well as the annoucenments of the three major debt relief
initiatives (HIPC, Enhanced HIPC, and MDRI). The x-axis shows the calendar dates and the y-
axis lists the different African HIPC elegible countries. The dates of the events affecting each of
the countries listed in the y-axis are represented by the markers that appear in the row
corresponding to each country. Decision and completion points under the original HIPC initiative
are represented by '+' and '○', while 'x' and '●' represent decision and completion points under
the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. Vertical lines correspond to the announcements of the three major
initiatives. The thick line corresponds to the dates of the G7 (G8) summit announcements and the
thin lines to the final endorsement dates.





































31C. Enhanced HIPC Initiative E. MDRI
Figure 3. Evolution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Three Major Debt Relief Initiatives
Figures in each panel display the evolution of cummulative abnormal returns (CAR) of South African
multinational companies with operations in countries elegible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives
for each trading trading day within a 10-day event-window around the date of the announcements (continuous
lines) and their 90 percent confidence intervals (broken lines). CAR are based on abnormal returns estimated
from a two factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days. Panel A display the CAR obtained by
pooling all major initiatives together, and Panels B to D separately display the evolution of the CAR
estimated for the HIPC initiative, the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event dates considered for
each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the G-8 summit held on June 27, 1996, June
18, 1999, and July 8, 2005.
A. All Three Major Initiatives B. HIPC Initiative
32C. Enhanced HIPC Initiative E. MDRI
Figure 4. Evolution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns Under Different Estimation Windows
A. All Three Major Initiatives B. HIPC Initiative
Figures in each panel display the evolution cummulative abnormal returns (CAR) of South African
multinational companies with operations in countries elegible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI
initiatives for each trading trading day within a 10-day event-window around the date of the
announcements. Different lines correspond to CAR estimated using estimation windows of different length.
In each panel, the thick line corresponds to the baseline values of the CAR obtained with an estimation
window of 112 trading days and the remaining lines depict the CAR obtained with shorter estimation
windows ranging from 102 to 52 trading days, in intervals of 10. The gray area is the envelope spanned by
the different sequences of CAR reported. Panel A display the CAR obtained by pooling all major initiatives
together, and Panels B to D separately display the evolution of the CAR estimated for the HIPC initiative,
the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event dates considered for each of these three major
initiatives correspond to the dates of the G-8 summit held on June 27, 1996, June 18, 1999, and July 8,
2005. CAR that are significant at the 10 percent level are marked with an 'x'.
33C. Enhanced HIPC Initiative E. MDRI
Figures in each panel display the evolution cummulative abnormal returns (CAR) of South African
multinational companies with operations in countries elegible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives
for each trading trading day within various event-windows around the date of the announcements. In each
panel, the thick line corresponds to the CAR obtained with an event window of 20 trading days around the
announcements, the dashed line those for 10 trading days, and the dotted line those for 5 trading days. In all
cases the estimation window is 112 trading days before the beginning of the 10 day estimation window plus
(minus) the difference corresponding to the varying length of the event window. Panel A display the CAR
obtained by pooling all major initiatives together, and Panels B to D separately display the evolution of the
CAR estimated for the HIPC initiative, the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event dates considered
for each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the G-8 summit held on June 27, 1996, June
18, 1999, and July 8, 2005.
CAR that are significant at the 10 percent level are marked with an 'x'.
Figure 5. Evolution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns Under Different Event Windows
A. All Three Major Initiatives B. HIPC Initiative
34C. Enhanced HIPC Initiative E. MDRI
Figure 6. Distribution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Different Sample of Firms
Figures in each panel summarizes the evolution cummulative abnormal returns (CAR) of South African
multinational companies with operations in countries elegible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI
initiatives for each trading trading in a 10 day event-window around the date of the announcements. Each of
the figures display the distribution of CAR at each day in the event window obtained after sequentially
dropping one of the affected firms from the sample. The gray area corresponds to the range in which the
different estimated CAR fall, and is enclosed by the minumum and the maximum estimated value. Within
the gray area, the continuous line is the mean of the estimated CAR, and the broken lines represent the 25th
and 75th percentiles values of the CAR. In all cases the estimation window is 112 trading days. Panel A
display the CAR obtained by pooling all major initiatives together, and Panels B to D separately display the
evolution of the CAR estimated for the HIPC initiative, the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event
dates considered for each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the G-8 summit
held on June 27, 1996; June 18, 1999; and July 8, 2005.
A. All Three Major Initiatives B. HIPC Initiative
35C. Enhanced HIPC Initiative E. MDRI
Figure 7. Evolution of Cumulative Median Rank Deviations of Cumulative Abnormal Returns
for Three Major Debt Relief Initiatives
Figures in each panel display the evolution of the cumulative mean rank deviations of abnormal returns (CAR)
of South African multinational companies with operations in countries eligible for each stage of the HIPC and
MDRI initiatives for each trading trading day within a 10-day event-window around the date of the
announcements (continuous lines) and their 90 percent confidence intervals (broken lines). CAR are based on
abnormal returns estimated from a two factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days, and the
same windows are used to determine the ranks. Panel A display the median rank deviations of the CAR
obtained by pooling all major initiatives together, and Panels B to D separately display the evolution of the
median rank deviations separately estimated for the HIPC initiative, the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the
MDRI. Event dates considered for each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the G-8
summit held on June 27, 1996, June 18, 1999, and July 8, 2005.
A. All Three Major Initiatives B. HIPC Initiative
36C. Enhanced HIPC Initiative E. MDRI
Figure 8. Evolution of Cumulative Median Sign Deviations of Cumulative Abnormal Returns
for Three Major Debt Relief Initiatives
Figures in each panel display the evolution of the cumulative mean sign deviations of abnormal returns (CAR)
of South African multinational companies with operations in countries eligible for each stage of the HIPC and
MDRI initiatives for each trading trading day within a 10-day event-window around the date of the
announcements (continuous lines) and their 90 percent confidence intervals (broken lines). CAR are based on
abnormal returns estimated from a two factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days. Panel A
display the median rank deviations of the CAR obtained by pooling all major initiatives together, and Panels
B to D separately display the evolution of the median rank deviations separately estimated for the HIPC
initiative, the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event dates considered for each of these three major
initiatives correspond to the dates of the G-8 summit held on June 27, 1996, June 18, 1999, and July 8, 2005.
A. All Three Major Initiatives B. HIPC Initiative
37C. Enhanced HIPC Initiative E. MDRI
Figure 9. Evolution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Three Major Debt Relief Initiatives.
Controlling for Thin-Trading
Figures in each panel display the evolution cummulative abnormal returns (CAR) of South African
multinational companies with operations in countries elegible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives
for each trading trading day within a 10-day event-window around the date of the announcements (continuous
lines) and their 90 percent confidence intervals (broken lines). CAR are based on abnormal returns estimated
from a two factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days and controlling for thin-trading by
using only trade-to-trade return data. Panel A display the CAR obtained by pooling all major initiatives
together, and Panels B to D separately display the evolution of the CAR estimated for the HIPC initiative, the
Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event dates considered for each of these three major initiatives
correspond to the dates of the G-8 summit held on June 27, 1996, June 18, 1999, and July 8, 2005.
A. All Three Major Initiatives B. HIPC Initiative
38C. Enhanced HIPC Initiative E. MDRI
Figure 10. Evolution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Final Implementation Dates of
Three Major Debt Relief Initiatives
Figures in each panel display the evolution of cummulative abnormal returns (CAR) of South African
multinational companies with operations in countries elegible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI initiatives
for each trading trading day within a 10-day event-window around the date of the announcements (continuous
lines) and their 90 percent confidence intervals (broken lines). CAR are based on abnormal returns estimated
from a two factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days. Panel A display the CAR obtained by
pooling all major initiatives together, and Panels B to D separately display the evolution of the CAR
estimated for the HIPC initiative, the Enhanced HIPC initiative, and the MDRI. Event dates considered for
each of these three major initiatives correspond to the dates of the final agreements on implementation of the
initatives during the Annual Meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund on September 29,
1996; September 26, 1999; and September 26, 2005, respectively.
A. All Three Major Initiatives B. HIPC Initiative
39Figure 11. Evolution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Decision and Completion Point
Events
Figures in each panel display the evolution of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of South African
multinational companies with affiliates in African HIPC countries benefited by decision and completion points
under the HIPC initiative during a 10 trading day window around the announcement of each decision and
completion point (continuous lines) and their 90 percent confidence intervals (broken lines). CAR are based on
abnormal returns estimated from a two factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days. Panel A
display the CAR obtained around decision point announcements and Panel B those around completion point
announcements.
A. Decision points B. Completion Points
40C. Difference Between Parent Companies with High
and Low Subsidiary Employment
Figure 12. Evolution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Three Major Debt Relief
Initiatives. Firms with Relatively Small and Large Investments in HIPC Countries
Figures in each panel display the evolution of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of South African
multinational companies with operations in countries eligible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI
initiatives for each trading day within a 10-day event-window around the date of the announcements
(continuous lines) and their 90 percent confidence intervals (broken lines). CAR are based on abnormal
returns estimated from a two factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days. Panel A (B)
display the CAR of parent companies with total employment in subsidiaries affected by the events below
(above) the median level across parents. Event dates considered for each of these three major initiatives
correspond to the dates of the G-8 summit held on June 27, 1996, June 18, 1999, and July 8, 2005.
A. Parent Companies with Low Subsidiary
Employment
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41C. Difference in CAR betwee companies in Resource
Extraction and Services
Figure 13. Evolution of Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Three Major Debt Relief
Initiatives. Firms in Resource Extraction versus Firms in Services
Figures in each panel display the evolution of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of South African
multinational companies with operations in countries eligible for each stage of the HIPC and MDRI
initiatives for each trading day within a 10-day event-window around the date of the announcements
(continuous lines) and their 90 percent confidence intervals (broken lines). CAR are based on abnormal
returns estimated from a two factor model using an estimation window of 112 trading days. Panel A displays
the CAR of parent companies in resource extraction industries and Panel B shows the CAR of parent
companies in the service sector. Event dates considered for each of these three major initiatives correspond
to the dates of the G-8 summit held on June 27, 1996, June 18, 1999, and July 8, 2005.
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